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The Davila decision
created law that makes ERISA a sword in the hands of insurance
companies against their vulnerable insured. Because ERISA was
written with pensions and employee retirement plans in mind...
the act was never intended to apply to health insurance. The court
has put a square peg in a round hole to try to fit claims against
insurance companies into a scheme created for pension and
employee retirement plans.1
The issue to be addressed is whether the Employment Retirement
Security Act (ERISA) preempts state law claims against a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) for its failure to meet ordinary standards
of medical care in its mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.2 One of the
sundry messages of Pegram v. Herdrich3 is that an HMO's mixed
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1. Coffey E. Stephenson, Malpractice Claims Against HMOs Preempted By ERISA,
LAw. WKLY. USA, July 5,2004, at 1.
2. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
3. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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eligibility and treatment decisions are neither preempted by ERISA nor
covered by federal common law and are subject to the state law malpractice
claims, according to the Fifth Circuit.4  The Fifth Circuit apparently
believes that a state could protect a patient's right to sue an HMO in state
court for a failure to meet the ordinary standards of medical care in a mixed
eligibility and treatment decision.5 On June 21, 2004, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in its Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila
(hereinafter Davila 1)6 decision by holding that ERISA preempts the state
law malpractice claim against an HMO because the HMO's decision to
deny treatment presented a question of eligibility or administration and not
an issue of treatment.7
Part I of this article will analyze preemption and the right to sue an
HMO for medical malpractice under state law with a discussion of relevant
lower court opinions including Roark v. Humana, Inc. (hereinafter Roark
J),8 Davila v. Aetna (hereinafter Davila 1),9 Calad v. Cigna Healthcare,°
and Corporate Health Insurance." Part II of this article will discuss the
rationale of United States Court of Appeal decision in Roark v. Humana,
Inc. (hereinafter Roark If).12 Part II of this article will critique the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Aetna v. Davila13 (hereinafter Davila 1).
I. PREEMPTION AND THE RIGHT TO SUE AN HMO FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE UNDER STATE LAW
On May 25, 2001, when the issue of suing an HMO for medical
malpractice in state court was presented below at the federal trial court
level in Roark I, Judge Fitzwater of the Northern District of Texas issued
an "amazing" memorandum opinion. 14 The federal trial court's holding can
4. Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
5. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2002). "The Supreme Court
has declined to decide whether § 502(a)(1)(B) displaces a medical malpractice claim
involving 'mixed decisions' ... and this circuit has not yet confronted the question. We
now conclude that § 502(a)(1)(B) does not preempt Calad's and Davila's THCLA claims."
Id. at 308 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229, n.9).
6. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
7. Id.
8. Roark v. Humana, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-2368D, 2001 WL 585874 (N.D. Tex.
May 25, 2001).
9. Davila v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-1855-Y, 2001 WL 34354948
(N.D. Tex. June 29, 2001).
10. Calad v. Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc. No. CIV. 3:00-CV-2693-H, 2001 WL
705776 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2001).
11. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
12. 307 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2002).
13. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
14. Roark, No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-2368D, 2001 WL 585874 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2001).
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be characterized as 'amazing' because real world logic and practical
experience support the conclusion that the plaintiffs' complaints about not
receiving reasonable health care treatments were caused in fact by Humana
HMO's pattern and practice and course of conduct.15 However, neither
good public policy nor congressional intent supports Judge Fitzwater's
conclusion that a pattern and practice of negligent conduct under state law
by a provider of health care benefits is preempted by ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions.16
In a recent article, David L. Trueman provides an excellent one-
paragraph description of what he refers to as basic ERISA principles.
17
ERISA is a far-reaching law approved in 1974 to look after beneficiaries'
pension plans; nevertheless, ERISA also contains provisions about welfare
benefit plans. ERISA's welfare benefit provisions have been construed to
have an effect on health benefits plans. 18 Two ERISA sections have an
impact on claims aligned with employer sponsored health care plans. 9
First, section 502(a) of the Act involves making decisions about employee
benefits while giving federal courts total jurisdiction concerning claims
about the denial of benefits.2° In the past, courts construed section 502(a)
to require state law tort claimants asserting an HMO's unreasonable refusal
of medical treatment to litigate the controversy under federal jurisdiction.2'
When the denial of the of health care benefit reaches the federal court,
section 514 has been used as an effective general preemption tool to defend
state law claims brought by plaintiffs with the end result habitually being a
dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action.22
Judge Fitzwater's application of section 514's general preemption
rationale to dismiss the plaintiffs' state medical malpractice claims with
little regard for the HMO's adverse impact on medical treatment seems to
represent a continuing misreading of congressional intent regarding the
applicability of federal preemption to State law claims that relate to an
employee health benefit plan.23 Judge Fitzwater's ERISA preemption
15. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (2004). "A civil action may be brought-(i) by a participant
or beneficiary-(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan .... " Id §
1132.
17. David L. Trueman, Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ERISA Preemption?,
13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 427, 428. (2004).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)).
23. Roark v. Humana, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-2368D, 2001 WL 585874 (N.D. Tex.
May 25, 2001). Title 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) provides in relevant part:
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rationale for state medical malpractice issues involving real questions of
treatment and only pre-textual issues of eligibility was admittedly endorsed
by all nine members of the Supreme Court in Davila II. It is unfortunate
that the Supreme Court in Davila II rejected the suggestion it made four
years earlier in Pegram v. Herdrich that the HMOs involved in ERISA
plans could be held liable for state law negligence and avoid issues of
preemption when the question involves real quality of treatment issues
rather than issues of eligibility.
In theory, one could support the contention made by Trueman that the
Supreme Court's rationale articulated in Pegram v. Herdrich may have
possibly "paved the way for a new line of ERISA jurisprudence, narrowing
ERISA preemption by identifying a new category for utilization decisions
which could avoid preemption. 24
Although Trueman successfully asserts that Pegram v. Herdrich could
have been the vehicle for the Supreme Court to avoid virtually wholesale
preemption of most state law claims involving ERISA medical treatment
claim, his view that the Court would use the case to avoid unintended
preemption of medical treatment issues is too optimistic. 25 After analyzing
the rationale of Pegram v. Herdrich, it was simply not convincing that the
Court would construe ERISA's general preemption provision in a manner
that would allow states to grant patients a bill of rights in the absence of an
express mandate from Congress to do so.
26
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title
and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29
U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)].
This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2005).
24. Trueman, supra note 17, at 434.
In Pegram, the Supreme Court started down the path of eliminating preemption
for claims alleging injuries resulting from wrongful denials or delays of
treatment but only when a patient's symptoms are included in the process of
making a pre-certification or utilization review determination. Although
Pegram examined fiduciary duties owed to ERISA plan beneficiaries, the Court
fashioned an opinion that extended well beyond the fiduciary duty issue into the
arena of utilization review and medical determinations of requests for treatment.
Id. at 434-35.
25. L. Darnell Weeden, An HMO Does Not Owe An ERISA Fiduciary Duty To Its
Employee Beneficiaries: After Pegram V. Herdrich, Who Will Speak For The Working
Class?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381. (2002). "[T]he purpose of this Article is to
demonstrate that Congress should amend ERISA to allow plan beneficiaries/patients to
assert medical malpractice claims and breaches of both fiduciary duty and contract against
both doctors and HMOs in the managed care industry." Id. at 387.
26. Id. at 387-88.
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After considering the allegations presented below, Judge Fitzwater
concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint implicated the administration of
benefits rather than the quality of medical treatment.27 The position taken
by Judge Fitzwater should be rejected because it is clear that the ERISA
health benefit preemption rationale is used by HMOs as a clear pretext for
the HMO's primary goal of actually controlling the quality of medical
treatment a patient receives while allowing HMOs to escape accountability
for their conduct impacting treatment. 8 Considering the facts as alleged by
the plaintiffs in Roark I, it would likely upset the American public to learn
of Roark rs holding that the plaintiffs merely suffered from an
inconvenient administrative benefits process rather than experienced life-
endangering second-class medical treatment from their HMOs.
In Roark I, the plaintiffs sued Humana in state court under the Texas
Health Care Liability Act [hereinafter THCLA] to dispute the coverage for
medical care Mrs. Roark received because of a spider bite.29 The lower
court in Roark I mischaracterizes the substance and heart and soul of the
complaint as an issue of coverage rather than a complaint about the inferior
quality of treatment she received after the administrative coverage issue
had been resolved. Humana successfully had the Roarks' lawsuit removed
from state to federal court under a theory of ERISA preemption;
subsequently the federal trial court denied Mr. and Mrs. Roark's request to
remand their claim to state court because of ERISA preemption.3°
Roark I illustrates how a misapplication of the ERISA preemption
principle denies a state the opportunity to exercise its reserved police
powers under the Tenth Amendment 3' to protect the health and safety of its
citizens from corporations or citizens who would render meaningless the
right to adequate medical treatment from an HMO. If the Tenth
Amendment means anything, it means that Congress may not preclude the
states from providing their citizens with effective patient rights against
HMOs and others in the managed care industry who may substantially
undermine the quality of health care treatment a citizen receives. "There is
an historic right to state sovereignty over public health and the Justices
have begun to recognize the very intense local interest of states in
27. Roark v. Humana, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-2368D, 2001 WL 585874 at *4 (N.D.
Tex. May 25, 2001).
28. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (2000) (stating that the provisions of ERISA shall
supersede any and all state laws that relate to any employee benefit plan).
29. Roark, 2001 WL 585874, at *1 (citing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
88.001-88.003).
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
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protecting their citizens from wrongful delivery of health care. 32 In spite
of the strong and compassionate state interest in insuring first quality
medical treatment for its citizens, the Supreme Court's Davila II opinion
denies a state the right to use its reserve powers to protect the health of its
patients/citizens because the Court has revived its expansive construction
of ERISA preemption.33
In an excellent article, Professor Larry J. Pittman argues that when an
HMO provides health care coverage as an insurer to employees under an
employer-sponsored health care plan, ERISA's saving clause, which saves
state regulation of insurance from ERISA preemption, applies.34 Professor
Pittman makes the logical and coherent case that applying the Supreme
Court's cannons of statutory construction to ERISA's express preemption
clause precludes a finding that ERISA's 1132(a)'s civil enforcement
provisions "preempt[s] a state law regulation that satisfies the savings
clause., 35 He effectively suggests that ERISA's savings clause is designed
to promote federalism by giving the states the ability to regulate insurance
32. Lorraine Schmall and Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move Towards
Defederalizing Claims For Patients' Rights, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 529, 530 (2004). "Three
decades of scholarship and creative lawyering calling for either a narrower interpretation of
federal preemption of state law and claims under ERISA or for the creation of meaningful
remedies under a federal common law has fairly gone unanswered." Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 541. "In the first generation of preemption decisions, the United States
Supreme Court described ERISA's preemption decisions as having 'a broad scope,' an
'expansive reach,' as being 'broadly worded,' and 'conspicuous for its breadth."' Id. (citing
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 47 (1987); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990)); FMC
Corp v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990)).
34. Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation Of ERISA'S Preemption And
Saving Clauses: In Support Of A State Law Preemption Of Section 1132(A) of ERISA'S
Civil Enforcement Provisions, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 613 (2004).
A further deconstruction of ERISA's preemption clause's language shows
that a saving clause-protected state law escapes ERISA's preemption even when
the state law conflicts with one of ERISA's substantive provisions. For
example, when the preemption clause's language speaks of preemption of state
laws, it does so regarding certain "provisions of this subchapter" superseding
state laws. Importantly, the "provisions of this subchapter" language refers to
Subchapter I of ERISA, which includes ERISA's "fiduciary responsibility"
provisions in §§ 1101-1114 and ERISA's "administration and enforcement"
provisions in §§ 1131-1147, which includes § 1132(a) of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions.
When the second phrase of ERISA' s preemption clause is read in conjunction
with the first phrase, the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause is that certain
sections of ERISA will preempt state laws except when such state laws regulate
insurance under ERISA's saving clause.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 614.
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where necessary to ensure an insured's right to a mandated benefits or a
mechanism to protect those benefits.36 Questions concerning the quality of
eligible treatments are clearly not administrative matters for an HMO
acting as an insurer to cover an eligible service. When decisions about the
quality of an ERISA claimant's medical treatment are made by an HMO,
an issue of state insurance regulation is presented and should not be
preempted under Professor Pittman's savings clause federalism rationale.37
Professor Pittman asserts that a proper understanding of congressional
intent and federalism allows a state to award compensatory damages even
"when [section] 1132(a) of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions does not
allow such damages. 38 A very expansive look at ERISA's savings clause
as advancing federalism should also allow state insurance laws to award
punitive damages in medical malpractice claims against HMOs when
deemed reasonably necessary by state officials to protect the quality of
medical treatment decisions made by HMOs contrary to the advice of an
ERISA insured patient's official.39 In Roark I, the trial court's assertion
that the complaint is not really directed at medical treatment40 is not
consistent with the experience of many patients who have received second
class medical treatment because of an HMO's aggressive denial of the
specific medical treatment recommended by the primary care physician.4'
One should apply a Justice Holmes truism to properly analyze the medical
treatment issue presented in the Roark case. Holmes' pronouncement that
"the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience ' ' 2 supports
the conclusion that ERISA's preemption rationale has been used by HMOs
to provide patients with second class medical treatment.43 Professor Sage
36. Id. at 599-603.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 602.
39. Id. at 602-03.
40. Roark v. Humana, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-2368D, 2001 WL 585874 at *2 (N.D.
Tex. May 25, 2001).
41. See Schmall & Stephens, supra note 32, at 538.
Under common law, state medical malpractice claims generally focus on
whether the quality of healthcare conforms to community standards. Although
administrative denials of a certain quantity or type of health care clearly impacts
a patient's health, courts are inconsistent, but typically adverse to finding an
employee-patient's rights to such redress under state common law.
Id.
42. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
43. Schmall & Stephens, supra note 32, at 531-32.
If an employee wants to bring a claim against the physician or the managed
health care organization, the employee must consider whether the claim will fall
under state law, or whether the state cause of action will be preempted by
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is absolutely correct in asserting that "separating the existence of benefits
from their quality makes little sense if a given level of quality is a
deliberately designed component, and not merely an accidental byproduct,
of an insurance benefit package." 44 Professor Sage states that several lower
courts have used their experience in the ERISA preemption quality of
health care battles to recognize the substantial clinical impact that health
care plans operated by HMOs have on the quality of a patient's health
care.45 Because of the potential adverse impact HMOs have on medical
decisions, these courts have avoided dismissing a patient's substandard
treatment claim under a rigid application of ERISA's preemption 46 logic to
employer-sponsored health care plans.47  The practical effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Davila II, which approved the trial court's
holding in Roark I, is a return to what Professor Sage appropriately
describes as a general understanding that insurers were basically immune
from tort liability prior to the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.48
In granting the defendant's request to dismiss the plaintiff s compliant
at the federal trial court level, the judge in Davila I provides some
instructive insights about the adverse impact of the preemption doctrine on
ERISA. Because state law may offer employees greater protections than
ERISA, broad federal preemption of state law under ERISA is also a part of the
problem for an employee seeking protection against employer discharges and
other acts that interfere with her rights to benefits. Rather than wait for
Congress to amend a complicated tax and labor statute, plaintiffs can begin to
look toward resolution in state common and statutory law.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic
Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597,
616 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 614.
"Preemption"-the extent to which federal ERISA law protects defendants from
suit under state law-matters greatly to the medical necessity debate. For the
vast majority of privately insured Americans who might choose to file lawsuits,
ERISA is the main difference between a dismissal and a generous award or
settlement. Before 1995, ERISA preemption was interpreted broadly, essentially
immunizing insurers from tort liability under state law and shielding self-funded
plans from state regulation.
Id.
47. Id. at 616 ("[C]ourts have used these doctrinal devices, which allow them to
emphasize the clinical influence of health plans and downplay managerial considerations, to
achieve rough justice for injured patients.").
48. Sage, supra note 44, at 615 (referring to New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)).
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the issue of medical care for employee patients and their families.
Although Judge Means' analysis in Davila I somewhat disregards public
policy and congressional intent for ERISA preemption of health care plans,
the judge does a first-rate job of describing the remedies available to a
patient concerning the quality of medical services under the complete
preemption theory as well as the conflict preemption theory.49
The facts in Davila I are stated in a straightforward manner by the
plaintiff and are not challenged by the defendant. ° The plaintiff seeking
proper medical treatment argues that the defendants, who oversee health-
care benefits claims for the plaintiff and his coworkers, negligently and
wrongfully dispensed inferior medicine to the patient in the course of
requiring the patient to utilize a specific prescription-drug formulary.5 In
particular the plaintiff finds fault with the defendant's decision not to cover
the Vioxx drug prescribed by his doctor for the plaintiffs arthritis pain.
The defendant declined to pay for the medication. The defendant's
negative response to the plaintiffs request for Vioxx was consistent with
its prescription drug formulary. The defendant's prescription drug plan
52
grew out of a utilization review lineup. Under this utilization review
lineup, Vioxx would not be made available "unless the insured has a
contraindication, intolerance, allergy to or a documented adequate trial of
at least two... formulary [non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs].."" As a
result of the defendants' drug formulary plan, the plaintiffs doctor
prescribed naprosyn for his arthritis pain. The plaintiffs complaint alleges
that he suffered bleeding ulcers because he was forced to take naprosyn and
that he almost experienced a naprosyn-related heart attack. The plaintiff
states that as a result of this condition, he was hospitalized as a critical care
patient for a number of days.54 It should come as no surprise that the
plaintiff believes that the plaintiff s critical illness was caused by taking the
naprosyn because plaintiff s doctor wanted to prescribe the drug Vioxx for
his arthritis rather than naprosyn. Stephanie Reinhart correctly concludes
that HMOs have "virtually destroyed the doctor-patient relationship by
forcing patients to see particular doctors and forcing doctors to perform
particular procedures."55  Reinhart appropriately suggests that ERISA
49. Davila, No. 4.00-CV-1855-Y, 2001 WL 34354948 at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. June 29,
2001).
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id.
55. Stephanie Reinhart, Note, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran: 21 Or Bust! Does
ERISA Preemption Give HMOs the Power to Gamble with Our Health?, 19 AKRON TAX J.
99, 131 (2004).
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preemption gives HMOs financial incentive to gamble with the health of
patient employees.56
After suffering through second-rate medical treatment by the
defendants, the plaintiff filed suit against them in a Texas state court
alleging a claim under the THCLA alleging that the defendant managed
care providers violated the act by carelessly engaging in medical
malpractice.5 ' The defendants responded to the plaintiffs claim by
removing this case to a federal district court. The defendants argue that
federal-question jurisdiction is present because the plaintiff's state-law tort
cause of action is completely preempted by the ERISA. Defendants
additionally contended that plaintiff's state-law claim should be dismissed
because the plaintiff may only declare his claim under ERISA.
Davila, the plaintiff, requested the federal court to remand the case to
state court because ERISA does not completely preempt his state law
malpractice claim. Davila stresses that federal-question jurisdiction does
not exist when a state law claim is not completely preempted and removal
of his state law malpractice claim to federal court is improper.58 Since the
defendants are the removing parties they possess the burden of resolving
whether a federal court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law tort
claim.59 The issue of whether federal jurisdiction exists on a given claim is
generally decided by applying the "'well-pleaded complaint rule. ' ''6°
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule "'federal jurisdiction is lacking
unless a federal question appears on the face of a properly pleaded
complaint; a federal defense does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction.''
In Davila I, the federal district court conceded that the plaintiff's state law
tort claim did not assert a federal claim on its face.62
Although many doctors may be stuck with HMO rules, independent review
statutes will allow patients to advocate for themselves the way doctors once
advocated for them .... Independent review statutes are exactly the kind of
"contracting regulations" needed to counterbalance the cost control measures
that are at the heart of HMO plans. They give patients an additional safeguard
when dealing with HMO administrators that allows them to feel like they have
some control over their own healthcare.
Id. at 131-32.
56. Id. at 127-44.
57. Davila v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 4.00-CV-1855-Y, 2001 WL 34354948,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2001) (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.001-88.003
(Vernon Supp. 2001)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir.
1995)).
60. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1983).
61. Id. (quoting In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)).
62. Id.
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The defendants in Davila I insisted that removal is appropriate since
federal-question jurisdiction is present under the complete preemption
doctrine. The complete preemption doctrine is exempted from the well-
pleaded complaint rule. The complete preemption rule applies when
Congress has so completely preempted a specific field that any civil
complaint bringing up this particular topic as a claim is inevitably federal
in character.63  When the plaintiffs state law claim is completely
preempted, a federal question exists no matter how the plaintiff formulates
the claim. 6' Once a federal question is established, the right to remove a
case from state court to federal court is appropriate.65 In litigation
involving ERISA, complete preemption arises as soon as a state-law claim
is appropriately inside the scope of the civil-enforcement provisions of
section 502 of ERISA. 66 ERISA's civil-enforcement provision creates a
federal claim each time an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary attempts
to enforce or clarify plan rights.67
In Davila I, the plaintiff appropriately asserts that his cause of action
disputes the quality of care he was given as a consequence of defendants'
involvement with its formulary treatment scheme.68 When a plaintiff
"attacks decisions made about his medical treatment, his claim does not fall
under [section] 502 of ERISA and thus is not completely preempted." 69 In
contrast, a claim declaring that an HMO turned down specifically requested
medical services or treatment on the ground that they were not provided for
under the plan obviously is one concerning the proper administration of




66. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132).
67. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). "ERISA also contains a second type of
preemption known as 'ordinary' or 'conflict' preemption. Section 514 of ERISA provides
that ERISA's provisions 'supersede any and all State common laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."' Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
Although section 514's 'conflict' preemption has been broadly construed, it
nevertheless is defensive in nature and therefore provides no basis for removal
jurisdiction under the well-pleaded-complaint rule. Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
Thus, "when the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the
plaintiff's state claim is arguably preempted under § 514(a), the district court,
being without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute regarding [§
514(a)] preemption. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir.
1995). Rather, it must remand to state court, and that court will resolve the
section 514(a) preemption issue.
Id.
68. Davila, 2001 WL 34354948, at *1.
69. Id.
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benefits and completely preempted under ERISA.7 ° The Davila I Court
correctly stated the issue as whether the plaintiff's cause of action contests
the administration of or eligibility for benefits under ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions and is completely preempted or whether the
plaintiff is actually challenging the quality of the medical treatment he
received which is not covered by complete preemption doctrine and could
be covered under a state law cause of action under ERISA's conflict
preemption theory.71
It was most unfortunate for Judge Means to describe Davila's attempt
to challenge the second-rate medical treatment he was receiving because of
Aetna's utilization of a formulary scheme as simply a peppering of his
cause of action "with quality-of-care and medical-treatment allegations.
72
While ignoring the reality of Davila's effort to seek the medical treatment
recommended by his doctor, Judge Means unfortunately misconstrues
Davila' s medical malpractice treatment claim as a cause of action involving
the administration of health care benefits covered under an ERISA plan.73
Despite Judge Means' ruling, Davila's disagreement with the
defendants' devotion to its prescription drug formulary, regardless of his
doctor's recommendation, is a quality of health care issue.74 When a
plaintiff's cause of action alleges that the defendants decline to provide
coverage for the drug recommended by his doctor, and as an alternative is
required to first try a less-expensive drug with a history of causing side
effects, the plaintiff properly raises an issue of medical treatment and not
the false issue of eligibility of benefits. Davila makes reality-check
argument that defendants' formulary policies are the functional equivalent
to an unacceptable practice of medicine. Judge Means' conclusion-that
Davila is simply disputing the defendants' decision concerning which
specific drugs are covered by the plan and the status of that coverage-is
out of touch with real-world medical treatments experienced by Davila and
other middle class patients.
75
Judge Means' conclusion that Davila's cause of action against
defendants relates to their administration of benefits covered by the plan
instead of the quality of health care he received is not supported by the
practical effect of being denied a course of treatment recommended by
Davila's doctor.76 To conclude that Davila's state-law medical malpractice
claim is completely preempted by ERISA because he was not concerned
70. Id.
71. Id.
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about the quality of medical treatment he was receiving under federal-
question jurisdiction law defies legal logic and ignores the common
experience of working-class employees struggling to receive first-rate
medical care from employer-sponsored managed care plans.
17
In Calad v. Cigna Healthcare, two plaintiffs in concert filed a state-
court negligence cause of action against their health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) alleging certain violations of the liability provisions
of the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA).78 Both plaintiffs allege
that each HMO's medical necessity evaluation wrongfully obstructed the
recommendations of their treating physicians and that they endured
damages because of the obstacles imposed by the defendants.79 Plaintiff
Calad objects to the medical necessity determination concerning the
duration of her hospital stay following surgery while plaintiff Thorn
contests the delayed authorization of his surgery following an injury in an
accident. °
In Calad, the federal district court addressed the controlling impact of
federal question removal for claims that may come within the scope of
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions under section 502(a).8' The Calad
court reflected on the role CIGNA played in processing Calad's requests
for medical services under Section 502(a) preemption.82 All the litigants
agree that Calad's health care was made available through CIGNA under a
plan covered by ERISA and sponsored by her husband's employer. Calad
asserts that section 502(a)'s complete preemption rationale cannot apply to
her state-law cause of action under THCLA because she is filing a lawsuit
against the HMO and not the ERISA plan. CIGNA (the HMO) executes
numerous administrative functions for the plan as well as give utilization
review services and make benefit decisions.3 The federal trial court
rejected Calad's argument and held that ERISA's section 502(a) civil
enforcement preemption scheme applies to claims against ERISA plans and
to claims against administrators of ERISA plans including the HMOs that
supply utilization review. Utilization review is a cost containment practice
used by HMOs to resolve the issue of whether medical services are
77. See id.
78. Calad, No. CIV.300-CV-2693-H, 2001 WL 705776, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 21,
2001) (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-88.003 (Vernon Supp.2001)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2-7. "Thorn receives his health insurance through his employer, the Azle
Independent School District. The ERISA statute makes clear that the complete preemption
provisions 'shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if such plan is a governmental
plan' .... ERISA, therefore, does not preempt Thorn's claims against Aetna." Id. at *6
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)) (citation omitted).
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appropriate or necessary. 84 The trial court appropriately described the
HMO's involvement in the utilization review process as central to plaintiffs
Calad's and Thorn's claims in this case.
Judge Sanders raised the quality of care issue in Calad, but he reached
the wrong conclusion on the issue of complete ERISA preemption under
section 502(a)'s civil enforcement provisions. The proper issue before
Judge Sanders concerning quality of care is not properly considered a
completely preempted federal claim when the utilization review process is
the functional equivalent of a medical treatment decision.86 The plain
language of THCLA 7 clearly demonstrates a legislative intent to treat the
utilization review process as a health care treatment decision when medical
services are actually provided and a decision in the process affects the
quality of the treatment given to patients like Calad.8 In considering the
facts surrounding the so-called medical service decision rendered in Calad
one should remember Justice Holmes' wise suggestion that the life of legal
justice is not abstract logic but the real experience of people. 9
Starting with a Justice Holmes "common experience" perspective as
one observes Calad's encounter with her HMO, one should ask whether the
HMO merely denied her additional time in the hospital because of a lack of
eligibility for coverage or whether the HMO made second-class quality of
care decisions under the thin guise of conducting a utilization review.
Calad's lawsuit seeks compensation under THCLA and not under her
ERISA plan. 90 Calad contends that at some stage while reviewing the pre-
authorization and coverage procedures, she was advised by Cigna that it
would approve only one day of hospitalization after her planned surgery (a
vaginal hysterectomy). On the second day following her surgery, a hospital
discharge nurse on behalf of a Cigna purportedly told Calad's treating
medical doctor (Dr. Estrada) that Calad must be released if she did not
demonstrate obvious hemorrhaging, fever or high blood pressure. If Calad
84. Kimberly R. Lambert, Comment, Providers' RICO Claims Fail To Solve The HMO
Problem: The Need For Federal Legislation, 5 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 135, 147-48 (2004)
(discussing HMOs' usage of utilization reviews, the difficulties faced by courts in
characterizing utilization review activity, and Congress' enactment of the Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act to improve, in part, utilization review activities).
85. Calad v. Cigna Healthcare, No. CIV.300-CV-2693-H, 2001 WL 705776, at *1
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 2001) (citing.TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-88.003
(Vernon Supp. 2001)).
86. Contra id. at *3-4.
87. Id. at *4 n.2 ("Specifically, an HMO or other managed care entity has a duty to
exercise ordinary care when making 'health care treatment decisions' and is liable for
damages for harm proximately caused to an insured or enrollee by the entity's breach of that
duty.") (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.002(a)).
88. See id. at *1.
89. HOLMES, supra note 42.
90. Calad, 2001 WL 705776, at *3.
AETNA HEALTH, INC. V. DAVILA
failed to show any of these observable symptoms, she could lengthen her
hospital stay only by agreeing to assume the cost. It is important to
understand that the medical necessity determination for extending patient
Calad's stay was predetermined by Cigna's HMO rather than the
considered medical determination of her treating physician Dr. Estrada.
Calad could not pass Cigna's medical necessity criteria for a longer
hospital stay and she could not afford to personally pay for any additional
time at the hospital.9 This situation strongly suggests that Cigna's medical
necessity criteria is consciously indifferent to the case-by-case medical
necessity determination of Calad's treating physician, Dr. Estrada, and to
her health, safety, and welfare as a patient.92
In the Calad decision, Judge Sanders was blinded by ERISA
preemption labels that categorize negligent quality of medical treatment
decisions made by HMOs under the ever-present self-serving utilization
review process as determinations about administration of medical benefits
rather than quality of health care.93 Judge Sanders' analysis falls short
because it fails to acknowledge that the ERISA civil enforcement complete
preemption battle is really not primarily about the fact that the HMO's
medical necessity decision impacted Calad's care, this ERISA preemption
battle for patient employees is really about the fact that medical necessity
determination is no longer made in the first instance by the treating medical
doctor of the insured.94 Unlike the view taken by Judge Sanders,95 when a
decision regarding the amount and type of services under a plan is
functionally indistinguishable from one concerning the quality of medical
treatment covered under the plan, both logic and experience dictate that it
be treated as a medical treatment decision that escapes the complete
preemption doctrine of ERISA' s civil enforcement provisions under section
502. Prior to the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Davila 196 a lively
controversy existed among the states about whether utilization review
constituted the practice of medicine.97  The Supreme Court's recent
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *5.
94. See id.
95. See id. "[T]he Court concludes that Calad's claim brought under THCLA is, at
bottom, not about quality of care but rather about her HMO's coverage determination and
administration of her benefits. The Court therefore holds that Calad's claims against
CIGNA are completely preempted and were properly removed under federal question
jurisdiction...." Id. at *6.
96. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
97. See, e.g., Allen D. Allred and Don L. Daniel, Health Law Symposium, Upon
Further Review: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care
Organization Liability, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 309, 359-61 (2003) (discussing how some
states followed the American Medical Association's determination that utilization review
constituted the practice of medicine, while other states took the opposing view).
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decision Davila unfortunately creates a reasonable argument that utilization
review determinations are not the functional equivalent of engaging in the
practice of medicine.98
Judge Gilmore, in Corporate Health Insurance v. Texas Department
of Insurance, demonstrated the wisdom of experience and compassionate
logic in finding no ERISA preemption where the Texas Health Care
Liability Act's (THCLA) provisions hold that managed care entities are
liable for substandard health care treatment decisions.9 In 1998, Judge
Gilmore appropriately rejected the arguments of health plans and insurers
that ERISA's federal preemption rationale applied to the THCLA's
substandard medical treatment decisions made through utilization
review.'0° Although Judge Gilmore's holding that the use of the utilization
review process to make medical decisions about the quality of treatment
received under an ERISA plan is properly viewed as presenting a medical
treatment determination under the THCLA, it has apparently been rejected
by the Supreme Court's mischaracterization of similar facts in Davila as
involving medical eligibility questions. Judge Gilmore's rationale for
treating utilization review as a medical decision deserves to be recognized
for objectively describing how the utilization review process is used to
make medical decisions about the quality of a person's health care.' °1
Judge Gilmore conceded that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc.'02 held that a Louisiana negligence lawsuit for the
wrongful death of an unborn baby was preempted by ERISA, while
expressing why the Fifth Circuit's ERISA preemption rationale used in
Corcoran should not apply to the utilization review process involving
medical treatment decisions. 1
03
The ugly consequence of the impact of an expansive ERISA
preemption rationale on the lives of real people is demonstrated by the facts
of the Corcoran case as discussed by Judge Gilmore in Corporate Health
Insurance.'°4 In Corcoran, United Healthcare, the provider of utilization
review services to an ERISA employee benefit plan, concluded that Mrs.
Corcoran's hospitalization throughout the closing months of her pregnancy
was not necessary in spite of her doctors' frequent and recurring
recommendations for complete bed rest.0 5 While rejecting her doctor's
98. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 (holding that, because Aetna's coverage decisions
were purely eligibility decisions, Davila's causes of action fell within the scope of, and thus
were completely preempted by, ERISA).
99. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 630 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
100. Id. at615-20.
101. Id.
102. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
103. Corporate Health Insurance, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 614-16.
104. Id. at 614-15.
105. Id. at 614-15 (citations omitted).
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recommendations, United merely approved ten hours per day of nursing
care at home for Mrs. Corcoran. 10 6 During the period the nurse was not on
duty the fetus became distressed and died. As a result, the Corcorans sued
for wrongful death contending that their unborn baby died because of the
negligent medical treatment decisions made by United. 7 In Corcoran,
United tried to ignore the fact it had made a medical treatment decision in
rejecting Mrs. Corcoran's doctor's advice for bed rest; United also stated
under ERISA preemption that the Corcorans could not sue under state tort
law to redress their child's death because the death was a result of dispute
about what benefits are due under an ERISA plan. 0 8  Judge Gilmore
pointed out that in Corcoran, the Fifth Circuit determined that United, in its
role as a provider of utilization review services, made medical decisions
while deciding the type of treatment available to Mrs. Corcoran under
ERISA plan benefits.10 9
The Fifth Circuit in Corcoran had the intellectual integrity to properly
characterize United's conduct in its utilization review process as making
medical decisions about available ERISA benefits. However, the court
reached a flawed conclusion by holding that ERISA's preemption of state
law medical negligence claims that applied to medical treatment decisions
left injured individuals like Mrs. Corcoran without an adequate remedy in
negligence."0 Judge Gilmore distinguished Corporate Health Insurance,
the case before her, from the Corcoran opinion in that a denial of a medical
treatment benefit in Corcoran is preempted by ERISA while a claim about
the quality of a benefit actually received is not preempted under ERISA."'
The rationale for Judge Gilmore's distinction between Corcoran and




110. See id. ("Despite its finding of preemption, the [Corcoran] court acknowledged 'the
fact that... [its] interpretation of the preemption clause... [left] a gap in remedies within a
statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans' and suggested a
reevaluation of ERISA.") (alterations in original) (quoting Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333,
1338-39).
111. Id. at617.
The plaintiffs in Corcoran filed suit against their HMO regarding a medical
decision made in relation to the denial of certain plan benefits. In this case, a
suit brought under the Act would relate to the quality of benefits received from a
managed care entity when benefits are actually provided, not denied .... [T]he
Act clearly states that a "health care treatment decision" is "a determination
made when medical services are actually provided by the health care plan and a
decision which affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment provided
to the plan's insureds or enrollees." Thus, Corcoran is factually distinguishable
from the instant case.
Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc.& REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(5)).
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Corporate Insurance is that a total denial of the health care treatment may
suggest that the rejection was based on a theory of eligibility under
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions."2 Judge Gilmore believes that the
ERISA preemption rationale should only apply to those situations like
Corcoran where the ERISA patient is totally denied physician-
recommended medical treatment in the utilization review process. 13 When
the utilization review process actually practices poor medicine by
approving substandard medical care for a patient counter to the
recommendation of that patient's physician, as was the case in Corporate
Health Insurance, Judge Gilmore, unlike the Supreme Court in Davila II,
would not apply ERISA preemption because a medical treatment decision
has actually been made. 114
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit properly upheld Judge Gilmore's
determination that the terms of the THCLA makes HMOs liable for
negligent use of the utilization review process in making medical treatment
decisions."' Judge Higginbotham's opinion for the Fifth Circuit, stating
that an HMO should be liable for rendering poor quality health care after
deciding that the patient is eligible to receive the service,"6 was
unfortunately overruled by the rationale of the Supreme Court in Davila."
7
However, it is beneficial to discuss Judge Higginbotham's treatment of
HMO liability issues because his analysis is well-reasoned and supported
by the way in which the utilization review process has been used to limit
the quality of health care received by patients.
More than thirty years ago, in response to rising costs for medical
services to employees, Congress approved changes in providing medical
services and limiting the liability of HMO under ERISA. Congress
apparently believed that an HMO acting as an intermediary between doctor
and patient on issues of medical services and payment would lower health
care costs."8 According to a recent newspaper report, Aetna Health Inc.
and Cigna Healthcare of Texas, the defendants in the Supreme Court's
Davila II opinion, applauded the Davila II decision. '19 Aetna and Cigna
said that they approved the opinion's use of ERISA preemption to keep




115. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir.
2000) (hereinafter, Corporate Health Insurance II).
116. Id. at 530.
117. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2501-02 (2004).
118. See Corporate Health Insurance 1I, 215 F.3d at 531 (summarizing the origin and
growth of HMOs).
119. Patty Reinert, Court Ruling Favors HMOs; Patients Can't Seek Damages at State
Level, Hous. CHRON., June 22, 2004, at Al.
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Court's ruling in the case holds employers' health care costs down. 2 The
insurers, Aetna and Cigna, made their unsupported allegations that the
Supreme Court's decision in Davila guaranteed that workers will keep on
obtaining affordable insurance through their jobs.1 21 "Yet insurance
premiums rose [eleven] percent in 2001, [thirteen] percent in 2002 and
[fourteen] percent in 2003, according to the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, and companies have asked workers to shoulder much of the
higher costs with more 'out of pocket' payments.1 22 The preemptive reach
of ERISA has been used on a consistent basis by the managed care industry
to create a federal enterprise that denies the state its traditional police
power to protect its patients by "regulating the new field of managed health
care"'123 without remotely meeting the congressional goal of reducing rising
health care costs 124 to either the employer or employees. Judge
Higginbotham in Corporate Health Insurance demonstrated proper
experience and logic by characterizing the issue as the ability of a state to
regulate the quality of health care services received by its citizens by
requiring that a duty of reasonable care be exercised by health care
providers under ERISA plans. 125 As noted by Judge Higginbotham, the
state of Texas properly exercised its health care police powers by adopting
a law providing the "health care treatment decision" with a very specific
definition. 126 Under Texas law, any decision after medical services are
made available that affects the quality of the treatment provided to the
plan's insured or enrollees is a medical treatment decision. 1
27
Before the Fifth Circuit, Aetna unsuccessfully contended that the
liability provisions in the THCLA related to an ERISA plan and also
involved plan administration. 128 Aetna argued as an abstract proposition
that an assertion that medical services were negligently offered certainly
challenges the provider's coverage decisions under an ERISA plan.
29
Texas asserted before Judge Higginbotham that the THCLA was not like
the difficult genre of cases challenging medical care and services that were
not provided because, under the THCLA, a provider did not have a duty to
provide treatment not covered by a plan. 30 The Fifth Circuit rejected




123. Corporate Health Insurance, 215 F.3d at 531.
124. Reinert, supra note 119.
125. Corporate Health Insurance, 215 F.3d at 531.
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because the law imposed liability for a restricted universe of claims. 3 The
Fifth Circuit specifically held that the THCLA did not include claims based
on a managed care entity's rejection of coverage for a medical service
suggested by the treating doctor.1 32 The THCLA permits lawsuits alleging
that a treating doctor was negligent in distributing medical services. 33
Also, the THCLA enforces vicarious liability against managed care entities
for the negligence of a medical care provider. Judge Higginbotham stated
that the THCLA's vicarious liability provision did not "refer to" the
managed care provider's responsibility as an ERISA plan administrator so
as to invoke ERISA preemption."3 Judge Higginbotham's legal experience
indicated that HMOs and managed care organizations (MCOs) usually
carry out the two independent jobs of health care insurer and medical care
provider. 35 A managed care entity is capable of supplying administrative
support for an insurance plan which might include making eligibility or
coverage determinations. 36 Simultaneously, a managed care entity is able
to act as a controller and provider of medical treatment.'37
While state efforts to police an entity in its role as plan administrator
are generally preempted, 38 managed care providers maneuver in a
traditional sphere of state police power when they act as health care
providers. 39  ERISA does not insulate physicians from professional
accountability to their state licensing agency, given the responsibility to
enforce standards concerning medical decisions.' 4 Judge Higginbotham
has taken the logical approach that accountability is essential to ensure that
ERISA plans operate inside the broad scope of sound medicine. ' 4' Unlike
the Supreme Court in Davila II, Judge Higginbotham properly concluded
that Congress could not have logically intended for ERISA preemption to
supplant Texas' regulation of the quality of medical practice in order to





134. Id. at 535.
135. Id. at 534 (citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir.
1995); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp.
1137, 1139 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 534-35.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 535.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE IN
ROARK H REVEALS THAT THE COURT USED SOUND LEGAL
REASONING AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TO EXCLUDE AN
OPPORTUNISTIC AND PERVERSE USE OF ERISA' S PREEMPTION
In Roark v. Humana,14 3 Judge Jerry Smith of the Fifth Circuit merged
four cases on appeal from multiple federal district courts below in order to
judge common issues of law. Ruby Calad, Walter Thorn, Juan Davila, and
Gwen Roark each filed a lawsuit against their HMOs alleging negligence
under the THCLA. The four plaintiffs claim that that their doctors'
recommended courses of treatment were negligently rejected by the HMOs.
The plaintiffs' state law claims under THCLA were removed to federal
court by the defendants under an ERISA preemption theory because the
plaintiffs' health care plans were sponsored by their employers.' 4 Judge
Smith discussed ERISA's two categories of preemption-complete
preemption and conflict preemption-before properly deciding that
because complete preemption did not apply to Calad's and Davila claims,
the federal district court was required to remand their respective THCLA
negligent medical treatment cases to state court. 145 The federal appeals
court also accepted Calad's and Davila's assertions that complete
preemption did not apply under these facts because the HMOs did not
render their negligent treatment determinations as fiduciaries of an ERISA
plan.
146
Concerning Roark II, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's
complete preemption holding in Pegram did not allow an ERISA patient to
make an HMO vicariously liable for a doctor's medical treatment
decisions. 147 Although the issue of whether ERISA's complete preemption
rationale precluded a patient from making an HMO liable because of its
negligent conduct was not decided in Pegram, the Fifth Circuit believed
that the Pegram court's categorization of three types of determinations
made by HMOs applied to the issue of HMO liability for its own
negligence under the THCLA. 48 The three categories of HMO evaluations
as discussed in Pegram are eligibility evaluations, treatment evaluations,
and mixed eligibility and treatment evaluations. 49 Eligibility evaluations
are based on an ERISA plan's coverage of a specific circumstance or
medical course of action for treatment of a condition.5 The Fifth Circuit
143. 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
144. Id. at 302.
145. Id. at 305.
146. Id. at 306.
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cited Pegram for the rather obvious proposition that pure eligibility
decisions about whether an appendectomy is a covered condition is very
uncommon. 15' A traditional treatment evaluation requires an HMO to
select the method for diagnosing and dealing with or handling a patient's
condition. 52 As explained by the Court in Pegram, mixed eligibility and
treatment evaluations made by HMOs are widespread and invoke the
question of which treatment option produces enough superior results to
satisfy the medical necessity obligation."3 Claims involving mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions are not covered by ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. 154 The Fifth Circuit logically asserted, based on its
judicial experience, that both Davila's and Calad's lawsuits against their
respective HMOs clearly involved mixed eligibility and treatment
evaluations.155 The Roark II decision properly applied Pegram's definition
of mixed treatment decisions to the facts of Davila's and Calad's claims to
conclude that their HMOs were making medical treatment decisions rather
than resolving the question of whether a patient under an ERISA plan was
eligible to receive medical services. 5 6 In basic terms, the legal dispute
among the parties before the federal appellate court in Roark did not
present a pure coverage or eligibility decision, as Cigna did not challenge
the fact that its ERISA plan covered hospital stays following a
hysterectomy, and Aetna did not contend its plan excludes a variety of
arthritis drugs.
57
The Fifth Circuit properly characterized the issue presented before it
as a mixed eligibility treatment decision under the rationale of Pegram
because the facts raise "when and how" medical necessity concerns about
whether Calad was provided adequate treatment (a sufficient number of
days in the hospital) and whether the HMO recommended the right
medicine for Davila-naprosyn instead of the Vioxx recommended by his
primary care physician. 15 The Fifth Circuit held that the Pegram decision
required it to abandon its prior conclusion that the denial of medical
treatment by a doctor raised a quality of care determination that avoided
ERISA preemption, but the same denial of treatment by an HMO is a
coverage or eligibility decision preempted by ERISA.' 59 Following the
recommendation of the Supreme Court in Pegram, the Fifth Circuit in








158. Id. at 302-03.
159. Id. at 308 n.ll.
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Calad's HMOs-not their identities as HMOs-and concluded that because
the HMOs were making mixed eligibility decisions, their conduct was not
preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 6 °  Unlike the
Supreme Court's holding in Davila II, the Fifth Circuit in Roark refused to
prematurely abandon Pegram's suggestion that mixed eligibility medical
treatment decisions are predominately quality of health care treatment
decisions escaping ERISA preemption and subject to traditional state tort
law claims. 161
In Roark II, the Fifth Circuit acknowledges that section 502(a)(1)(B)
permits a beneficiary under the plan to file a civil lawsuit to enforce his or
claims for benefits provided by the plan. 162 The Fifth Circuit's logic and
judicial experience appropriately recognized that Calad's and Davila's
claims alleging medical malpractice by an HMO under the THCLA was not
an ERISA civil enforcement breach of contract claim. 163  Unlike the
Supreme Court in Davila II, the appellate court in Roark II held that Calad
and Davila did not allege breach of contract claims; they assert tort claims
under state tort law. Calad and Davila had not filed a lawsuit against their
plan administrator and they had not contested his interpretation of an
ERISA plan.'64
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the conclusion that ERISA does not
make available a medical malpractice cause of action against a negligent
HMO. When ERISA's conflict preemption under section 514 or its
complete preemption under section 502 forbids a state from granting
malpractice tort remedies, a patient will not have any tort remedy against
an HMO for serious negligent misconduct. 165 The Fifth Circuit in Roark II,
unlike the Supreme Court in Davila II, properly rejected Cigna's and
Aetna's arguments that Congress intended section 502(a)(1)(B)'s federal
contract reimbursement claim to be the only remedy available against an
HMO that has negligently made a mixed eligibility treatment decision
about the quality of health care an ERISA patient/employee receives. 166 As
a matter of implicit public policy and a sense of fairness and justice, the
Fifth Circuit was troubled by the fact that ERISA's conflict and complete
preemption rationale could be used to completely deny state tort relief to
deserving plaintiffs suffering because of an HMO's negligence in making a
mixed treatment decision. 167
In Roark II, the court appropriately observed that states may not
160. Id. at 308.
161. Id. at 308 n.ll.
162. Id. at 308-09.
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replicate the claims provided by under ERISA's section 502(a). 68
Complete preemption is properly implicated when state law claims are
clones of ERISA's contract claims. 16 9 The Roark II court correctly
concluded that a THCLA tort law claim sounding in negligence simply
does not provide an action for collecting benefits under a contract theory
and therefore it is not preempted by ERISA's complete preemption
rationale. 170 In the Roark II opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court cited Pegram
for the proposition that ERISA is not a proper vehicle to preempt a state
malpractice claim under its tort law. 17' The Fifth Circuit was correct in
asserting that it did not believe Congress intended to create a federal
common law of medical malpractice.'72 Under the rationale of its Davila II
decision, the Supreme Court destroyed state common law negligence
medical malpractice claims against HMOs for ERISA claimants seeking
medical assistance under a mixed eligibility decision without creating a
malpractice corollary under the federal common law. By mischaracterizing
the mixed eligibility determination in Davila II as a pure eligibility
decision, the Supreme Court has given ERISA preemption such an
expansive role that HMOs are now able to escape both federal and common
law claims of medical malpractice for its de facto medical treatment
determination.
The facts presented in the 2002 Roark II opinion 173 are the same as
those presented in the Corcoran decision, as discussed in Part I above.
Essentially, Mrs. Corcoran filed a lawsuit against her HMO claiming that
its negligent denial of adequate treatment was the proximate cause of her
baby's wrongful death. 174 In Corcoran, the Fifth Circuit appropriately
rejected the HMO's bold assertion that not one aspect of its conduct
involved medical decisions; the court also refused to accept Mrs.
Corcoran's argument that not a single aspect of the HMO's conduct
concerned a benefit determination." HMOs make benefit decisions in the
course of deciding whether benefits are available under an ERISA plan.
176
"[F]rom this perspective, it becomes apparent that the Corcorans are
attempting to recover for a tort allegedly committed in the course of
handling a benefit determination."'' 77 The Fifth Circuit grudgingly decided




171. Roark, 307 F.3d at 311 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236-37 (2000)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at313.
174. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 1332.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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conflict preemption rationale.7 ' In Roark II, the Fifth Circuit recalled that
at the time of the Corcoran decision (1992), the court acknowledged the
harm its decision would cause to future ERISA employee patients and their
beneficiaries. "ERISA provided no cause of action for medical mal-
practice; if ERISA also preempted all state medical malpractice claims,
patients such as the Corcorans would be left with no remedy for potentially
serious mistakes. But, we were bound by Supreme Court precedent, which
at that time articulated an expansive view of ERISA preemption.' 79
Because the Supreme Court, in the Davila II opinion, elected to return to its
expansive view of preemption, the Court has in effect adopted the
untenable position "that one of Congress's goals in passing ERISA was to
shift medical judgments from doctors to plan administrators."' 8
III. A BASIC REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S LOGIC
IN DA VILA H
While writing an opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Davila II,
Justice Thomas mischaracterizes the nature of the plaintiffs allegations in
the litigation as presenting a simple challenge to their HMOs negligent
handling of coverage decisions under the THCLA.' The plaintiffs'
lawsuit is properly understood as contending that the defendant HMOs
breached their duty to exercise due care in the handling of mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions in violation of the THCLA. 82 Juan Davila and
Ruby Calad, respondents, filed independent lawsuits in Texas state court
against Aetna Health Inc. and CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc.,
petitioners, under THCLA § 88.002(a). 8 3 Davila and Calad contend that
petitioners' denial of coverage for medical services recommended by their
primary care doctors violated their "duty to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions," and that these decisions to deny
treatment "proximately caused" their injuries.' 84 Petitioners successfully
removed the cases to federal district courts on the legal theory of complete
preemption under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)'s claim for benefits.
85
Since the respondents declined to amend their complaints to bring




179. Roark, 307 F.3d at 313-14.
180. Id. at 315.
181. Aetna v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2492 (2004).
182. See id. at 2493.
183. Id.




740 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:3
Both Davila and Calad appealed the federal district courts' refusals to
remand their cases to state court. 187 The Fifth Circuit combined their cases
with several others presenting comparable ERISA preemption issues. 8
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that state causes of action that "duplicate[]
or fall[] within the scope of an ERISA [section] 502(a) remedy" are
entirely preempted and consequently are removable to federal court.'89
Once it considered the causes of action available under section 502(a), the
Fifth Circuit decided that respondents' claims raised issues under ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B), which permits a cause of action for the retrieval of an
incorrect refusal of benefits, and section 502(a)(2), which permits lawsuits
challenging a plan fiduciary for a violation of a fiduciary duty under an
ERISA plan.' 90
In Davila II, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's allegations that
the HMOs breached their duty to follow the ordinary standard of
reasonable care while making mixed eligibility and treatment decisions
about the quality of health care employee patients receive in violation of
the THCLA.9 1 The Court in Davila II, in defiance of its analysis in
Pegram, fails to properly classify the HMOs conduct as presenting an
incidental issue of coverage and predominant issue of treatment under its
Pegram mix eligibility and treatment logic because the Court wants to
make it clear that ERISA has an expansive preemptive reach under either
its conflict prong192 or complete preemption prong.' 93 The Supreme Court's
decision in Davila 1I to expand the role of ERISA in the field of health
care194 has virtually allowed the Court to abandon its earlier statements in
Pegram that HMOs typically make the following three kinds of decisions;
(a) pure treatment, (b) pure eligibility and (c) mixed eligibility treatment. If
the Supreme Court can conclude that the facts of the plaintiffs' case in
Davila H creates a pure eligibility determination under its Pegram criteria
for determining the type of decision made by an HMO, the Court has for all
intents and purposes collapsed its mixed eligibility and pure treatment
decisions into the fold of a pure eligibility decision at the discretion of the
HMO decision maker. Under the Supreme Court's Davila I logic, when
an HMO actually makes a treatment decision that is a substantial factor in
increasing the risk of harm to an ERISA patient, it can avoid liability under
a state's negligence law by simply engaging in the pretext that its
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal
citations omitted)).
190. Id. at 2493-94.
191. Id. at 2488.
192. Id. at 2495.
193. Id. at 2495-96.
194. Id.
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predominantly quality of treatment determination is an incidental by
product of its patient/employee adverse coverage decision.
In order to decide whether Davila's and Calad's claims came "within
the scope" of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), Justice Thomas concluded it
was necessary to consider the statute on which their allegations of
negligence are based (the THCLA) as well as the ERISA plan
documents. 95 Davila contends that Aetna makes available health coverage
through his employer's health benefits plan. 96 Davila furthermore states
that after his primary care physician prescribed Vioxx, Aetna rejected the
doctor's advice and decided not to pay for it.' 97 According to Justice
Thomas' characterization of the facts, "the only action complained of was
Aetna's refusal to approve payment for Davila's Vioxx prescription.'
98
Davila challenged Aetna's refusal to pay for the Vioxx prescription most
likely because that action was the functional equivalent of a mixed
eligibility treatment decision under the standard for the types of decisions
made by HMOs established by the Court in its Pegram decision. Justice
Thomas improperly concluded that "the only relationship Aetna had with
Davila was its partial administration of Davila's employer's benefit
plan.' 99  Aetna had a dual relationship with Davila in its partial
administration of the plan by making eligibility determinations; Aetna also
had a utilization review medical treatment determination role under the
mixed eligibility treatment standard approved in Pegram.
In the same way, Calad asserts that she has ERISA beneficiary health
plan coverage from CIGNA through her husband's employer. Justice
Thomas concedes that Calad was advised by CIGNA, at the time of her
admittance at the hospital for major surgery, that it would authorize a stay
for one day only. 2°° Calad contends that CIGNA's agent-a discharge
nurse-declined to authorize more than one day despite the advice and
recommendation of the doctor treating her.2"' It defies medical reality for
the Supreme Court to superficially conclude that "Calad contests only
CIGNA's decision to refuse coverage for her hospital stay"2 2 without at
least acknowledging that Calad is challenging CIGNA's right under ERISA
to use an incidental or ministerial coverage question to undermine the
quality of medical treatment decisions made by her treating physician.
Similar to the Davila's case, the real connection between Calad and
CIGNA is CIGNA's ability to apply the incidental administrative aspects
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of Calad's ERISA-regulated benefit plan to dominate and control the
reasonable quality of medical treatment Calad fails to receive.2 3
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas amazingly states
"[i]t is clear, then, that respondents complain only about denials of
coverage promised under the terms of ERISA-regulated employee benefit
plans."2° Both respondents, Davila and Calad, were actually complaining
about a denial of ordinary reasonable medical treatment once their
respective HMOs, Aetna and CIGNA, made incidental coverage decisions.
The HMOs made predominantly medical treatment decisions to provide
their ERISA claimants with inferior health care to increase profits rather
than lower the cost of health care. The Supreme Court's advice to working
middle-class families who have been refused the benefit of reasonable
medical treatment recommended by their primary care doctor to pay "for
the treatment themselves and then [seek] reimbursement through a [section]
502(a)(1)(B) action, or [seek] a preliminary injunction"2 5 is remarkably
unimpressive and not practical for many middle class families struggling to
make ends meet. Most middle class American ERISA plan patients cannot
afford to pay for expensive medical treatment services denied by the HMO
and for the cost of hiring a lawyer to fight their ERISA treatment claims in
federal court while seeking reimbursement remedies because an HMO
made an improper medical treatment decision.
Even if one concedes that the requirements of the THCLA in the
context of both Davila and Calad's claims are not independent of ERISA or
the plan terms, the THCLA escapes ERISA preemption when the Court
properly applies the substance of its mixed eligibility treatment rationale as
articulated by the Court in Pegram. In Pegram, the Court stated that mixed
treatment eligibility decisions made by HMOs were not preempted by
ERISA. "The THCLA does impose a duty on managed care entities to
'exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions,' and
makes them liable for damages proximately caused by failures to abide by
that duty. ' 2° In Davila II, a managed care entity did not correctly conclude
"that, under the terms of the relevant plan, a particular treatment was not
covered. 2 7 In Davila IH the managed care entity provided made a mixed
eligibility treatment decision under Pegram that was the proximate cause of
any injuries arising from that determination. An HMO's negligent making
of the mixed eligibility treatment decision under the terms of the plan itself
could be the proximate cause of an ERISA's beneficiary's injuries
permitted to escape ERISA preemption under Pegram's mixed eligibility
203. Contra id.
204. Id. at 2497.
205. Id. (citing Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2001)).
206. Id. at 2497 (quoting TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 88.002(a)).
207. Id.
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treatment decision standard for HMOs.
Justice Thomas used a hypothetical example-a plan explicitly
excluding from coverage the cost of surgery for an appendectomy-to
support his conclusion that it is the plan itself, not the HMO that
administered the ERISA plan, that denies the person eligibility coverage.2 8
Justice Thomas' appendectomy hypothetical does not apply to the facts of
the Davila II case because the ERISA plan itself does not explicitly exempt
an HMO from its duty to use reasonable care when making a mixed
eligibility treatment decision at the sole discretion of the HMO health care
provider.2" The appendectomy hypothetical used by Justice Thomas
would only apply to Justice Thomas' exclusionary ERISA coverage
rationale if Davila's plan explicitly excluded drug prescriptions and Calad's
ERISA plan explicitly excluded hospital stays for any surgeries
performed.21 °
In the Davila II opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that Davila and
Calad sued to remedy the wrongful denial of benefits guaranteed under
ERISA-regulated plans; that they were not trying to deal with any
violations of legal rights beyond the scope of ERISA.211 The Supreme
Court held that because both Davila's and Calad's state causes of action
came "within the scope of' ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), they were
completely preempted and removable to federal district court.21 2 "The
limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the 'careful
balancing' between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a
plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans. 213
In Davila II, the Supreme Court gave the Pegram mixed eligibility
treatment decision an extremely narrow application214 that unnecessarily
interferes with a state's Tenth Amendment reserve power to regulate in the
field of health care when Congress has been silent about ERISA
preemption. In its narrowest sense, the Davila II Court unfortunately
appears to suggest that it is when the physician making the eligibility
determination for an HMO is also allowed to make the treatment decision
for an HMO that Pegram's mixed treatment eligibility decision rule
applies.21 5 In Davila II, the Supreme Court missed a golden opportunity to
expand the definition of ERISA's mixed eligibility treatment determination
to include any decision made by an agent or employee of an HMO where
the predominantly medical determinations are an intricate and controlling
208. Id. at 2498 n.3.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. ld. at 2498.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2499 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)).
214. Id. at 2501.
215. Id.
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product of an HMO routine ministerial administrative function.216
IV. CONCLUSION
In their concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
correctly characterized the current ERISA preemption regimes in the field
of health care as unjust and tangled. However, Justice Ginsberg's
suggestion that the Supreme Court's decision in Davila II is consistent with
either logic, experience of the states in the field of health care, or the
Supreme Court's prior cases governing the scope of ERISA preemption is
arguably improper. 2 17 For the reasons previously articulated in the analysis
of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Roark II, I contend that the Fifth Circuit's
analysis is more consistent with prior cases controlling the scope of ERISA
preemption than that of a unanimous Supreme Court in Davila II. In my
opinion Justices Ginsburg and Breyer could have voted to affirm the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Roark II rather than simply recommend
that Congress and the Supreme Court revisit the unjust effect on patient-
employees of the current ERISA preemption regime.1 8 It is unfortunate
that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer did not write dissenting opinions in
Davila H defending the necessary and appropriate analysis taken by the
Fifth Circuit to limit the scope of ERISA preemption in those cases like
Davila II which, according to the Fifth Circuit, are truly cases of mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions.2 9
Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that the Supreme Court has joined
together "an encompassing interpretation of ERISA's preemptive force
with a cramped construction of the 'equitable relief allowable under
[section] 502(a)(3)," to create a "regulatory vacuum" that in effect denies
ERISA plan beneficiaries any tort damages against HMOs for medical
malpractice.220 Under this regulatory vacuum, Justice Ginsburg observes,
"virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal
substitutes are provided., 22' In the next case with facts and issues similar
to Davila II, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer should lead the way in
persuading the Supreme Court to adopt the position taken by the Fifth
Circuit in Roark II as a necessary first step toward reversing a "series of the
216. Id. at 2501-02.
217. See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care's "Thirty Years War":
The Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 316-17
(2004) (discussing how patients, plaintiffs' lawyers, and state regulators have been pushing
the courts to rethink ERISA preemption, as ERISA MCOs and HMOs have become more
and more ruthless in their cost-cutting strategies).
218. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (citations omitted).
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Court's decisions [which have] yielded a host of situations in which
persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain
make-whole relief., 222 Congress should adopt a Patients' Bill of Rights
(PBR) Law to wipe out the vast regulatory vacuum created by ERISA's
conflict and complete preemption rationales that leave patients without any
adequate legal remedy when an HMO's conduct is proximate.223 It is my
sincere hope that one day Congress will enact meaningful PBR legislation
to protect all Americans from the bottom-line oriented eligibility and
treatment decisions made by big business HMOs and other greedy
corporate actors in the managed care industry.
222. Id.
223. Contra Edward A. Zelinsky, Against A Federal Patients' Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 443 (2003).
[Tihe original defense of a federal PBR has been undermined by the subsequent
evolution of the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. That case law today
construes ERISA section 514 as generally permitting state regulation of HMOs
and similar medical care providers, both statutorily and via malpractice liability
rules, even when such providers service employers' medical plans. Thus, there
is no longer a regulatory gap and no need for federal legislation in the form of a
PBR to fill the void.
Id. at 443-44.
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